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The almost stereotyped statement most frequently heard: in connection with 
the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia is that compared to the other Central and 
Eastern European countries it is in Yugoslavia where the situation of the Hun-
garian minority is the most satisfactory considering both the constitutional and 
political arrangement and its realization in practice. In Hungarian journalism and 
official politics during the 1960s and 1970s the Yugoslavian policy towards natio-
nal minorities was even described as something absolutely positive or at best as 
the example to be followed. On the other hand in the opinion of the general 
public in Hungary the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia - compared to the Hun-
garian minority in Romania and Czechoslovakia - always occupied - and still does 
- a particularly marginal place, combined with a latent but still continuously pre-
sent guilty conscience because of the massacres in the South region (Novi Sad and 
Sajkas) in 1942.2 These factors have covered up the major differences in the 
histoiy of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia since the autumn of 1944 - 1 am 
speaking of the years 1944 and 1945 but I could also mention the period between 
1945 and 1948 - and the reaction they have evoked is: "We'd better keep quiet." 
Nevertheless it is a fact that the rights and established opportunities of the 
Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia are really better - have been made better -, but 
it is not a type of abstract ideal; we cannot even say so on the strength of their 
own opportunities and needs, it is only in a relative sense - compared with the 
much worse circumstances of the Hungarian minority in Romania, Czechoslovakia 
1 This study is the extended version of the lecture given at the 1989 conference of the Protestant 
Academy for Hungarians in Europe. 
2 Enikő A. Sajti: Délvidék 1941-1944. A magyar kormányok délszláv politikája. [The South Region 
1941-1944. The Southern Slav Policy of Hungarian Governments.] Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 
1987 pp. 152-168. 
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and in Sub-Carpathia. On the other hand, to get a realistic picture of the pos-
sibilities of the preservation of their Hungarian identity it must be realized that 
they did not and still do not live in a sheltered place, independent of space and 
time, and that their history also has its constant and variable elements. 
In the past 70 years there have been quite a few cases where one generation 
of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia has gone through more frequent changes 
of border and state, which in each case meant a fresh start. Falling from the 
position of a national majority into that of a minority always means a collective as 
well as individual trauma, a loss of social, cultural and national security, and a 
need to seek a way out. It implies a painful social amputation, and by virtue of 
logical necessity in most cases it means the loss of the intelligentsia and the mid-
dle class attached to the previous state. 
This is what happened to the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia in the autumn 
and winter of 1944; compared to the border change in 1918 it was such a historical 
burden - because the above mentioned massacres - that the 500.000 Hungarians 
were within an inch of having the same fate as the German minority there and the 
Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. The policy of the "collectively guilty Hun-
garian minority" and the vengeance of "we'll pay you back for everything", the 
mass executions, the terrible atmosphere of the labour camps and the threats with 
deportation lasted only for a few months here. From the beginning of 1945 the 
situation eased considerably, still the effect of these things must not be neglected.3 
But it would be a mistake to think that the postwar loyal attitude of the Hun-
garian minority was only due to the above mentioned retaliatory measures taken 
by the new power or that it could be attributed to a guilty conscience because of 
the years 1944/45. The structural composition of the Hungarian minority also 
pointed to a social revolution and the assertion of equal rights. We are talking 
about a minority society where - as modernization in Central and Eastern Europe 
was long-delayed and had its own peculiarities - only a modified and combined 
Edvard Kardelj: Seianja. Borba za priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-1957. Beograd, 
1980 p. 85. ' 
Balogh Sándor: A népi demokratikus Magyarország külpolitikája 1945-1947. [The Foreign Policy of 
the Hungarian People's Democracy. 1945-1947.] Budapest, 1982 p. 36. Enikő A. Sajti: ibid. pp. 243-
251. 
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form of the so called primary and secondary social restratification could take 
place. By primary social restratification in sociology they mean tjie breakup of the 
earlier agrarian structure and craft industry by capitalist industrial development; 
by secondary they mean the course of events after the development of large-scale 
industry. The bulk of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia were peasants - land-
less peasants and agricultural labourers, who were left out when the last distribu-
tion of land took place - and the structure of the working class in the middle of 
the 20th century was the type that had been long absent in Western Europe. The 
number of intellectuals drastically decreased, which I'll illustrate with one single 
figure; in Voivodina in 1945 there were only three secondary school teachers left 
who had a degree. Let alone the fact that the members of the Hungarian middle 
class fled almost without exception or became the victims of the retaliations. Even 
today about half of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia work in agriculture 
mostly as private smallholders; the ratio of blue-collar workers to white-collar 
workers is 82 to 18 as opposed to the national ratio of 70 to 30.4 
In connection with ownership one thing must be mentioned: the Hungarian 
minority, in Yugoslavia is the only Central and Eastern European minority which 
in the sense of ownership has. not been completely eliminated. About half of the 
Hungarians that work in agriculture are entrepreneurs.5 
The literature on the question of national minorities agrees that not only the 
archaic social structure is a factor of the survival of a minority but also the struc-
ture of settlements i.e. wether the members of a minority live in relatively the 
same place or they are scattered in the given country. 
In the northern part of the country 3/4 of the Hungarian minority live mostly 
along the Hungarian-Yugoslavian border in the Autonomous Territory of Voivodi-
na, which is a multinational and not Hungarian autonomous territory. Here the 
4 Varga László: A jugoszláviai magyarság társadalmi, politikai helyzete. [The Social and Political Sit-
uation of the Hungarian National Minority in Yugoslavia.] Hid 10-11/1970. 
5 Arday Lajos: A jugoszláviai magyar nemzetiség helyzete 1981. Jelentések a határokon túli magyar 
kisebbség helyzetéről. (Csehszlovákia, Szovjetunió, Románia, Jugoszlávia.) [The Situation of the 
Hungarian Minority in Yugoslavia. Reports on the Situation of Hungarian Minorities Abroad 
(Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, Romania, Yugoslavia)] Medvetánc Könyvek, Budapest, 1988 p. 271. 
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Hungarians live rather closely together, while in Croatia and Slovenia they are in 
diaspora.. According to the findings of László Rehák in the 1960s a half of the 
450.000 Hungarians in Voivodina lived in settlements where they were in the 
majority.6 However, there are some negative tendences as well, which must be 
pointed out: ever since 1945 the absolute number of the Hungarian minority in 
o Yugoslavia and their ratio in the whole population has been constantly decreasing. 
From 496.000 it has dropped to 427.000; their percentage in Voivodina has fallen 
from 25.8% to 18.9% in the "whole of Yugoslavia from 3.1% to almost one half, 
1.9%.7 
Of course these negative tendencies are not unknown elsewhere either, how-
ever, in Yugoslavia the diminuation and ageing of the Hungarian minority - the 
Hungarian minority is the most aged in Yugoslavia - is counterpoised by the 
dynamic, almost explosion-like increase of the other non-Slavic minority, the 
Albanians. On the other hand, paradoxically, the factors that usually obstruct 
assimilation - a more archaic social structure, living in relaively the same place stc. 
- have under the peculiar Yugoslavian circumstances started to encourage assimi-
lation and emigration. In the 1970s, when a great number of guest workers floo-
ded to the west, as many Hungarians left Yugoslavia every year - 2Ö00 - as the 
natural increase in their population. But even in proportion to their percentage in 
Voivodina the Hungarians were over-represented among the emmigrants.8 
There is an inverse ratio between the numerical proportion of Hungarians and 
the tolerance of the majority nationalities - Serbs, Croatians, Slovens. Where the 
Hungarian population is fewer - Slovenia, Croatia - the tolerance of the majority 
society is greater, there are more official gestures and also more successful results. 
Let me mention only a few typical facts: the special linguistic and cultural or-
ganisations of the Hungarian minority only exist in Slovenia and Croatia. (The 
6 . Rehák László: Kisebbségtől a nemzetiségig. [From Minority to Nationality.] Forum, Novi Sad, 1978 
p. 202. 
7 Arday Lajos: ibid. p. 268. 
8 Mimics Károly: Demográfiai jellegzetességek a jugoszláviai magyar kisebbség életében. [Demogra-
phic Peculiarities in the Life of the Hungarian Minority in Yugoslavia.] Hid, 1/1970 pp. 83-99. 
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Association of the Hungarians in Croatia and the Educational and Cultual Or-
ganisation of the Hungarian Minority) while the Republic of Serbia still does not 
see any reason for the existence of such vertical organisations, saying that any 
minority problem can be solved in the most natural way by the general political 
and social organisations, people's committees and self-governing bodies. 
Obviously historical phenomena cannot be squeezed into mathematical for-
mulae and strict correlations. This is also true for the matter of numerical propor-
tion and tolerance, even if we know that unfortunately the law of numbers influen-
ces a country's policy towards national minorities. In our opinion in Serbia's case 
there is the consideration, or to be more precise, the fear that if the Hungarians 
living in the territory of the Republic formed organisations to safeguard their own 
interests, the Albanians would demand the same. However, this logic has long 
I 
been outdated in history. Since 1981 the establishment of their own republic 
rather than the foundation of a kind of minority cultural organization has been in 
thé centre of Albanian demands. 
The following question has to be asked as well: what made it possible that 
after the tribulations of the beginning period of minority existence the Hungárián 
minority in Yugoslavia gained promising cultural, constitutional and legal posi-
tions. What happened here - the number of institutions and constitutional oppor-
tunities increased and they got firmly established - was different from what hap-
pened in Romania, where under orders-from above the conditions of culture and 
minority existence in general were quietly but deliberately and tenaciously phased 
out and then completely eliminated. Let me mention a few examples: an intéllec-
tual workshop for Hungarian studies - the first in Central and Eastern Europe 
after 1945 - was set Up in Yugoslavia, namely the Institute of Hungarian Studies in 
Novi Sad (since the Hungarian Departmènt and the Institute were united in 1976 
it has been called Institute of Hungarian Linguistics, Literature and Hungarian 
Studies)i but I could also mention the work done by Forum Publishing House and 
the publication of art and sientific journals and books in the town of Subotica. 
In my opinion the causes of this can be found in the wider historical circum-
stances, in the changes that have taken place in Yugoslavian home policy and in 
the démocratisation process, which Yugoslavian historians call the formation of a 
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self-governing society. Not wanting to spend much time on going into details about 
it I'1! mention only one important fact: the reforms which were once introduced 
with the purpose of, and - it was believed - with the result of breaking up state-
socialism resulted in spectacular though short-lasting economic development, 
increasing social consensus and the gradual fading away of false reactions towards 
the Hungarian minority. In 1959 it was officially expressed that minorities are "not 
only part of the country they originate from, but they are also attached to the 
country they live in, and the more guaranties there are for their legal equality and 
undisturbed development the stronger this attachment is".9 The above mentioned 
measures, the educational policy, the constitutional provisions of local statutes, the 
bilingual notices in the streets and so forth undoubtedly helped "minorities feel 
more and more at home. 
It is rightly asked whether it is still true today or whether it was only true in 
the long bygone days of economic development and social consensus. The question 
is all the more right because there are two categories that history surely does not 
know: the euphemistic expressions of "for ever" and "never". 
The question can be put differently: what is the effect of the crisis - indicated 
by the nearly 1500% rate of inflation, demonstrations, counterdemonstrations and 
nationalities opposed to one another - on the opportunity for the Hungarian 
minority to survive? 
Before t ry ing to answer the question, we must make a few notes about the 
nature of the Yugoslavian crisis, the roots of which can be found in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
The economicc reform in 1963, the constitutional reform in 1974 and the 
associated labour law in 1976 served a double purpose: it was believed that by 
destroying the federation i.e. .the central ownership of the Yugoslavian state and 
by the introduction of the market economy it was possible to prevent the revival 
of both state chauvinism - behind which even today we can see the nationalism of 
the Serbs - and republican separatism. While, however, the economic reform of 
9 Rehák László: Nemzet, nemzetiség kisebbség Jugoszláviában. [Nation, Nationality and Minority in 
Yugoslavia.] Gondolat, Budapest 1988 p. 45. 
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the 1960s was stopped, the reform of the federation, i.e. its decentralisation, was 
carried out within the scope of the unchanged one-party system. As a result the 
situation in Yugoslavia became unique: the central role of the federal institutions 
was taken over by the republics, and the control of the economy* and politics 
became the monopoly of the party hierarchy of the republics. So the fight began 
"for the best seat at the dinner where the corps of the federation was served up" -
as a Yugoslavian historian wittily observed.10 From the single-centered party-state 
the multi-centered state of Yugoslavia was born, however, the republics themsel-
ves maintained the characteristics of centralized and bureaucratic state socialism. 
There was a craze of investment due to foreign loans, the biggest in Yugoslavian 
history, which were supposed to legitimize the new leadership of the republics 
rather than make a profit. Howfever, as a result of the associated labour law the 
financial resources were divided among 600.000 organisations (OOUR), -were 
frittered away, and so were not enough for the necessiary big investments such as 
roads, oil refineries, electric power stations. The public kept quiet, the standard of 
living of almost all social strata became higher - redundant workers flowed to the . 
western countries. 
At the turn of the 1970s and 1980s - Tito was already seriously ill - there were 
two political tendencies waiting with their guns at their feet: those who were 
against centralism because they got the defeated federation as a sacrificial lamb 
and the followers of the strong-arm policy who were given the heads of the Croa-
tian and Albanian "nationalists". Although after Tito's death it was possible to 
make a painless transition without heavy fighting for power, this silence, it is now 
clear, was only the lull before the storm. 
The problems in Kosovo shocked the public: the state, which was taken by 
surprise, reacted to the problems with drastic measures, and so the appearance of 
Serbian nationalism, hurt and seemingly forced to be on the defensive and the 
10 DuSan Bilandzid: Jugoslavia posle Tita. 1980-1985. Zagreb, 1986 p. 35. 
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withdrawn but more and more clamorous Albanian national movement was not 
surprising.11 
The first reaction of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia to the crisis was 
fear. The fear was that the crisis by virtue of its nature would destroy their estab-
lishments. (Recently the intellectuals in Voivodina had to protest against the 
closure of a secondary school.) There is no definite answer to the question when 
and how Serbian nationalism, which has so far been occupied with the crisis in 
Kosovo, will expanded towards the north, in the direction of Voivodina. It is also 
known that the changing picture of an enemy is not alien from nationalism, i.e. 
when one concrete "enemy" - more precisely the Albanian minority labelled as an 
enemy - is suddenly transformed into the picture of the enemy as minorities in 
general. 
The most important question, of course, is: are the rival powers of Yugos-
lavian political life going to put the Hungarian minority in the stocks again, or on 
the contrary, is there going to be a new synthesis born from the chaos of the crisis 
and the decline of the traditional forms of the survival of minorities? 
L The Kosovo crisis is exemined in detail by Branko Horvat: Kosovsko pitanje. Zagreb, 1988; Batric 
Jovanovid: Kosovo. Inflacija, socijafne razlike. Beograd, 1984. About crisis in general: Branko 
Horvat: Jugostavenska pnvreda 1965-1983. Zagreb, 1984; by the same author: Jugoslavensko 
druitvo u krizi. Zagreb, 1985; Mijalko Todorovit Politiiko bide druStvene krize. Zagreb, 1986. 
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A J U G O S Z L Á V I A I M A G Y A R O K 1945 U T Á N 
(TÖRTÉNELMI V Á Z L A T ) 
A tanulmány a jugoszláviai magyar kisebbség 1945 utáni helyzetét elemzi Röviden felvázolja 
társadalmi szerkezetüket, főbb demográfiai adataikat, majd utal a többségi nemzetek magyarokkal 
kapcsolatos politikájának mozgatórugóira. A továbbiakban arra keresi a választ, hogy e kisebbség 
jogai, önmegőrzésének intézményes keretei miért alakultak kedvezőbben az 1944-1945-ös mélypont 
ellenére is, mint á romániai, kárpát-aljai és a csehszlovákiai magyarságé. Az okokat a jugoszláviai 
magyar kisebbséget körülvevő tágabb történeti közegben, Jugoszlávia belpolitikai életében, az 50-es, 
60-as évektől kibontakozó változásokban jelöli meg. Ezek elemzése után megállapítja: az államszoci-
alizmus széttörésének céljával bevezetett - s a szerző szerint ebből a szempontból csekély eredményt 
hozó - reformok rövid ideig látványos gazdasági felfutást, erősödő társadalmi konszenzust és a 
magyarsággal szembeni hamis reflexek elhalványulását, a kulturális, alkotmányos, jogi lehetőségek 
bővülését jelentették. 
A 60-as, 70-es évek reformjai azonban negatív tendenciákat is magukban hordoztak: a központi, 
föderatív intézmények etatista szerepét átvették a köztársaságok, s az egyközpontú pártállamból 
megszületett a policentrikus etatista Jugoszlávia. A 80-as évek elején kirobbanó koszovói válságra az 
állam durva eszközökkel reagált, s a társadalom porondján megjelent a sértett, látszólag védekezésbe 
szorított szerb nacionalizmus. A jugoszláviai magyarság első reakciója e válságra a félelem érzése 
volt. Attól tartottak, hogy a válság elindíthatja eddig kiépített intézményrendszerük erózióját, s a 
szerb nacionalizmus a Vajdaság irányába is eszkalálódik. A kérdések kérdése ma az - írja tanulmánya 
befejező részében a szerző -, hogy a jugoszláv poltikai életbén egymással versengő erők vajon újabb 
kalodába szorítják-é az ottani magyarságot, avagy ellenkezőleg, a válság zűrzavarából és a kisnépek 
hagyományos önmegőrző formáinak felbomlásából új szintézis születik-e? 
27 
